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Abstract 
Whereas domestic public policy is increasingly penetrated by international governmental 
organisations, domestic government institutions seem less adaptive. This puzzle triggers the 
following question: To what extent is the internationalisation of domestic administrative 
policy moulded by domestic government? Put more starkly, how intimate relationships exist 
between domestic government decision-making and domestic policy? The paper outlines one 
organisation theory perspective emphasising a tight coupling of ministerial decision-making 
and administrative policy, and one supplementary perspective advocating a loose coupling of 
government decision-making and administrative policy through transgovernmental processes 
of imitation. Reporting from the area of administrative policy and based on survey data on 
civil servants in the Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Government Administration (MGA) 
(N = 140), this paper demonstrates that Norwegian administrative policy has become strongly 
internationalised whilst the decision-making processes of MGA is only moderately 
internationalised. The analysis indicates a partial de-coupling of MGA decision-making and 
the internationalisation of administrative policy. The internationalisation of Norwegian 
administrative policy seems only partly steered and forged by the domestic top ministerial 
leadership, and partly affected by the import of administrative models from international 
governmental organisations. 
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Introduction1 
Domestic public policy is in transition at the crossroads of national and supranational 
governance (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Kohler-Koch, 2003; Wessels, Maurer and 
Mittag, 2003). Observing that domestic policies adapt with less friction towards international 
governmental organisations (IGOs) than domestic government institutions (Olsen, 2003a; 
Radaelli, 2004), this paper poses the following question: To what extent is the 
internationalisation of public policy governed by domestic government institutions? Put more 
starkly, how intimate relationships exist between government decision-making and public 
policy (Kohler-Koch, 2003, 11)? Reporting from the area of administrative policy the 
research question is phrased as follows: To what extent is the internationalisation of domestic 
administrative policy moulded by domestic government? Drawing on survey data from the 
Norwegian Ministry of Labour and Government Administration (MGA), the research 
hypothesis is that the decision-making of the MGA ultimately forms administrative policy. 
The alternative hypothesis is that administrative policy is loosely coupled to MGA decision-
making and forged by the dynamics of transgovernmental imitation. Whereas pre-existing 
research on administrative policy strongly emphasises policy path-dependencies, policy 
editing and policy translations (e.g. Olsen 2003a; Sahlin-Andersson 2002), this paper 
highlights that administrative policy reflect the mix of government innovation and 
transgovernmental imitation. Administrative policy is ultimately the result of governmental 
decisions to innovate and transgovernmental processes of imitation. The empirical 
observations benefit from a survey, conducted in 2003, on the decision-making behaviour 
among MGA civil servants (N=140). 
 
Administrative policy is targeted at instrumentally changing the formal organisation, 
procedures and staffing of public administration (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, 8). 
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Administrative policy includes those sets of goals, problems and solutions that aim at 
consciously reforming public administration. Administrative policy is partly introvert directed 
towards reorganising the government apparatus internally, and partly extrovert focused on 
redrawing external organisational borders towards local and regional government bodies, 
private sector, civil society, and IGOs. The internationalisation of administrative policy 
exhibits different faces (e.g. Olsen, 2003b). In this study internationalisation signifies 
administrative policy becoming increasingly penetrated by and becoming similar to 
administrative policies in other countries and IGOs (convergence in outputs). Extensive 
internationalisation signifies existing core-properties of domestic administrative policy being 
replaced by new core-properties and that existing and imported policy properties are merged 
and fused. Moderate internationalisation implies that existing policy components are 
supplemented with new components and that they live side-by-side but remain mutually 
distinct.  
 
In operational terms, the end-product of internationalisation is measured as the adaptation of 
elements from the global New Public Management (NPM) package (Hood, 1991; Sahlin-
Andersson, 2002, 43). Representing the administrative orthodoxy during the past 20 years, 
based on public choice theory and managerialism, the NPM reform package has emphasised 
that a radical surgery and replacement of core-properties of existing government institutions 
and procedures is needed (Aucoin, 1990; Olsen, 1996; Peters and Savoie, 1994). NPM is a 
multi-dimensional reform brandy focusing on government efficiency and effectiveness, on 
drawing clear-cut boundaries between politics and administration, between buyers and 
suppliers, and between regulators and service providers (Geri, 2001, 447). The NPM reform 
package also focuses on horizontal and vertical organisational specialisation of government 
units, on contracting out, on professional and generic leadership, on monitoring results on the 
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basis of explicit standards and measures of performance, and on privatisation and the 
contracting-out of public service production (Hood, 1991, 4). “[T]he private sector provide[s] 
the inspiration” (Peters and Savoie, 1994, 421). 
 
Nation-states are increasingly penetrated by abrupt and piecemeal transformational pressures 
from IGOs. This tendency is documented in the recent power and democracy-studies in 
Denmark and Norway, and increasingly felt within the field of administrative policy (Geri, 
2001; Togeby et al., 2003; Østerud, Engelstad and Selle, 2003). Moreover, whereas some 
scholars picture IGOs as key motors in the transformation of nation-state policies (Cowles, 
Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Kohler-Koch, 2003; Wessels, Maurer and Mittag, 2003), others 
advocate that the IGO-effect is moderate and strongly associated with existing national 
government institutions, traditions and practices (Anderson, 2002; Olsen, 2003a). These 
contending conclusions reflect the complex, puzzling and poorly understood linkages between 
IGO-dynamics and nation-state transformations (Radaelli, 2004). Among the paradoxical 
observations is the fact that policy changes at the nation-state level seem imperfectly 
associated with institutional changes at the EU level (Olsen, 2003a). At the more general 
level, these puzzles highlight poorly understood dynamics between the formal organisation of 
government institutions and the public policy crafted by it (Egeberg, 2003). This paper 
suggests two faces of internationalisation of administrative policy: First, internationalisation 
as government innovation (H1), secondly, internationalisation as transgovernmental imitation 
(H2). 
 
This paper demonstrates that Norwegian administrative policy has become increasingly 
internationalised whilst the decision-making processes of the MGA are only moderately 
internationalised. The analysis indicates and illustrates a partial de-coupling of domestic 
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government decision-making and the internationalisation of administrative policy. The 
internationalisation of Norwegian administrative policy is pictured as partly steered and 
forged by the government and partly the result of transgovernmental processes of imitation 
through IGOs such as the European Commission and the OECD.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next two sections outline two faces of internationalisation 
and applies two theoretical perspectives to explain these. First, an organisational theory 
perspective advocates an intimate and causal relationship between ministerial governance and 
policy dynamics. Assuming a less intimate relationship between government decision-making 
and administrative policy, a network approach is suggested. The third section introduces the 
empirical record. The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. Step I accounts for the 
internationalisation of Norwegian administrative policy based on existing bodies of research. 
Step II analyses empirically the decision-making behaviour of civil servants in the Norwegian 
MGA. The empirical puzzle illustrated is to what extent the decision-making behaviour of 
MGA officials (STEP II) accounts for the internationalisation of Norwegian administrative 
policy (Step I).  
 
Two faces of internationalisation 
We may envisage two distinct faces of internationalisation in the realm of administrative 
policy. First, a ‘traditional conception of administrative internationalisation’ champions that 
internationalisation is fostered by transgovernmental processes of imitation that is loosely 
coupled to government decision-making. A second conception of ‘emerging patterns of 
administrative internationalisation’ assumes a tighter and causal link between government 
decision-making and administrative policy. 
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For centuries the norms, resources, organisational capacities, routines and personnel 
pertaining to the formal organisation of domestic public administrations was loosely coupled 
to domestic government. In the middle ages the Catholic Church, through the international 
Church administration, the Catholic educational system and the common Latin vocabulary, 
was an important facilitator of organisational standards of public administration in Europe. 
National top civil servants were socialised into European cosmopolitans through the Catholic 
Church. European universities also contributed to secular learning and socialisation of 
national civil servants and contributed to shared notions of public administration among top 
civil servants in Europe (Knudsen, 2002). According to this pictures, administrative policy in 
Europe was subject to transgovernmental diffusion and learning and there was a lack of 
domestic organisational capacities, recourses, routines and traditions for instrumentally 
manipulating the domestic administrative policy. Henceforth, administrative policy was 
loosely coupled to domestic governance. From the Peace of Westphalia (1648) administrative 
policy became slowly engrained into territorial sovereignty (Knudsen, 2002). 
 
This brief presentation of a ‘traditional pattern of internationalisation’ emphasises pan-
European imitation of administrative forms and practices. Internationalisation results from 
transgovernmental diffusion and learning of administrative standards, often linked to 
individual civil servants engrained into transgovernmental networks that expose the officials 
to shared perceptions of administrative standards (Knudsen, 2002, 38). This ‘traditional 
pattern of internationalisation’ is less affected by government stearing than by learning 
processes among pan-European circles of civil servants and by external actors such as 
management consultants, independent ‘think-tanks’ and academics (Knudsen, 2002, 39; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000, 20). “Processes of internationalisation [were] neither supported 
nor effectively hindered by government actions…” (Gornitzka, Gulbrandsen and Trondal, 
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2003, 26). This is the century-old mode of “voluntary” internationalisation where national 
administrative ‘policies’ mirror those of neighbouring countries, governments and ministries 
(Engel, 2003, 244). “Due to lack of trial-and-error learning across time, actors often search for 
learning across space – internationally – in order to reach desired goals” (Gornitzka, 
Gulbrandsen and Trondal, 2003, 27).  
 
New emerging patterns of internationalisation of administrative policy have emerged during 
the last 20 years. These patters supplement the ‘traditional’ pattern by being less driven by 
“voluntary” imitation among individual civil servants. Administrative policy has emerged as 
an independent domestic policy area supported by a formal administrative apparatus with 
established routines for administrative reform, permanent staff and economic resources 
(Grønlie, 1999). After centuries of administrative internationalisation through the pan-
European university institution, the nation-state increasingly define administrative policy as a 
part of its territorial sovereignty. Moreover, IGOs like the OECD and increasingly also the 
EU have set new standards and rules for administrative policy to which domestic 
administrative policies comply. IGOs are not neutral vessels that merely aggregate the 
administrative policies of the member-states but transformative institutions with independent 
administrative policies, administrative capacities and fiscal resources to reform the 
administrative policies of the member-states (Marcussen, 2002). According to this 
conception, domestic administrative policy is increasingly penetrated by international hard 
laws (like EU directives) and international soft laws/standards (like those submitted by 
OECD’s PUMA committee). New patterns of internationalisation thus imply that domestic 
administrative policies are crafted by legal rules, formalised norms and codified standards of 
appropriate administrative policy established by domestic government and IGOs (Brunsson 
and Jacobsson, 2000; Kohler-Koch, 2003; Olsen, 2003a).  
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The ‘traditional’ and the ‘emerging’ patterns of internationalisation reflect different causal 
mechanisms. Arguably, the internationalisation of administrative policy reflects inbuilt 
tensions between policy innovation and imitation. A reform-optimistic organisation theory 
perspective is suggested (H1), emphasising a tight coupling of government decision-making 
and administrative policy (the ‘emerging pattern of internationalisation’). Administrative 
policy is ultimately the result of government decisions to innovate. Secondly, a reform-
pessimistic network approach is advocated picturing a loose coupling of government 
decision-making and administrative policy through transgovernmental processes of imitation 
(the ‘traditional patterns of internationalisation’) (H2). Combined, H1 and H2 maximises the 
criteria of analytical parsimony and power in accounting for the internationalisation of 
domestic administrative policy  (Wildavsky, 1987, 4).  
 
H1 An organisation theory approach. 
An organisation theory perspective assumes a direct and intimate relationship between the 
formal organisation of public administration, the decision-making processes being evoked and 
ultimately the public policy produced (Egeberg, 2003). This approach shares the classical 
assumption of Samuell E. Finer, namely that “the regime type influences the politics of the 
regime” (Qvortrup, 2003, 135). This is a reform-optimistic perspective arguing that the 
administrative policy observed is a direct product of wilful political-administrative leaders 
who have comprehensive insights into and power over administrative reform processes 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2002, 24). Comprehensive or first-order reforms of administrative 
policy are crafted by powerful executive institutions with relevant means-end knowledge and 
considerable political and administrative resources (March and Olsen, 1989).  
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This perspective departs from the assumption that formal organisational structures mobilise 
systematic biases in public policy because formal organisations provide cognitive and 
normative shortcuts and categories that simplify and guide decision-makers’ behaviour and 
role enactment (Simon, 1957). Organisations provide cognitive maps that simplify and 
categorise complex information, offer procedures for reducing transaction costs, give 
regulative norms that add cues for appropriate behaviour as well as physical boundaries and 
temporal rhythms that guide decision-makers’ perceptions of relevance with respect to public 
policy (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; March and Olsen, 1998). Government officials 
resemble the ‘administrative man’ faced with computational limitations with respect to the 
potential mass of problems, solutions and consequences present (Simon, 1957). Oweing to the 
bounded rationality of decision-makers, the horizontal specialisation of government 
institutions systematically reduces the attention of decision-makers into a limited number of 
relevant considerations (Gulick, 1937). Moreover, by carving the organisation into vertical 
hierarchies of rank and command the decision-making behaviour evoked by civil servants are 
guided by the political-administrative hierarchy through disciplination and control (Lægreid 
and Olsen 1978, 31). Public policy is thus the result of hierarchical imposition and horizontal 
departmentalisation of organisational structures where an exclusive group of participants, 
problems, alternatives and solutions reside (Olsen, 2003a). This perspective also departs from 
an instrumental approach that sees political and administrative leaders as instruments which 
may be utilised to realize political goals (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002).  
 
In our case, the internationalisation of administrative policy is forged by the Norwegian 
government apparatus (the MGA), with its own organisational capabilities, permanent staff, 
routines, economic resources, distinct reform-language, and shared mental maps. The 
internationalisation of administrative policy becomes an embedded bureaucratic routine 
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forged by the horizontally and vertically organised ministry. The government apparatus is not 
a neutral tool available to the political majority in office, and there is not a neat separation 
between the political sphere and the administrative sphere of government. Administrative 
policy is crafted by the vertical ministerial hierarchy of political will and administrative 
command, and convened within horizontally specialised ministerial units and divisions 
(Gulick 1937).  
 
According to this perspective the decision-making behaviour of MGA officials is likely to be 
reflected in the administrative policy crafted by this Ministry. The internationalisation of 
administrative policy is thus fostered by an ex ante internationalisation of decision-making 
behaviour among the MGA civil servants. We thus anticipate a parallel amount of 
internationalisation of decision-making processes among MGA officials and in the field of 
administrative policy. Moreover, observed correlations between (i) government decision-
making and (ii) administrative policy indicate a causal effect from (i) to (ii). 
 
H2 A network approach.  
There is a growing literature on governance by network, or ‘governance without government’, 
which champions that public policy is less intimately associated with government hierarchy 
and less bound to the nation-state (Bogason and Toonen, 1998, 214; Kohler-Koch, 2003). 
Networks are seen as “informal, intricate and unstable with an unlimited number of 
participants” and contribute to mutual interpenetration of actors from different branches of 
government (Van Warden, 1992, 30).  
 
Domestic civil servants constantly engage in transgovernmental networks that transcend the 
control of the domestic ministerial leadership (Jönsson, 2001, 205). These networks blur 
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several government levels, notably the national and supranational levels of government. 
Transgovernmental networks cut across territorial borders and involve domestic civil servants 
as autonomous, interdependent and interwoven partners (Marin and Mayntz, 1991, 18). 
Transgovernmental networks may be normative networks providing norms of appropriate 
administrative standards, and they may be epistemic networks with shared assumptions of 
causal relations between for example the organisation of government systems and 
administrative productivity (Haas, 1992). Transgovernmental networks may be strongly 
institutionalised, providing the participants with shared preferences, identities and beliefs, and 
they may be loosely connected issue networks with few endogenous dynamics (Rhodes and 
Marsh, 1992). Transgovernmental networks foster the emergence of complex, overlapping 
and interconnected webs of actors, solutions and consequences that cross-cuts and challenges 
domestic governance (Kohler-Koch, 2003, 12). Arguably, domestic civil servants may adopt 
shared perceptions of appropriate administrative policy by participating in transgovernmental 
networks (Sahlin-Andersson, 2002). Often based on informal and interpersonal actor-
constellations, the frequency and intensity of contact among the network-members may cause 
a transgovernmental socialisation of the participants (Börzel, 1998, 259; Rhodes and Marsh, 
1992, 184). Studies suggest that such tightly coupled networks may develop distinct norms, 
rules and practices that contribute to an international standardisation of policy (e.g. Brunsson 
and Jacobsson, 2000). Transgovernmental networks represent webs of poorly co-ordinated 
government institutions and decision-makers, accompanying uneven and fragmented 
processes of internationalisation of public policy within different domestic government 
institutions (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch, 2003, 16). Consequently, the emergence of 
transgovernmental networks are likely to contribute to fragmented, segmented, and loosely 
coupled national administrative policies.2  This argument challenges environment 
deterministic approaches arguing that, “a country may adopt internationally based norms and 
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beliefs about how a public business should be organized and run simply because they have 
become the prevailing doctrine” (Lægreid et al., 2004, 11). 
 
Transgovernmental networks are sometimes formalised within IGOs, like the OECD’s PUMA 
committee and EU’s web of expert committees (Marcussen, 2002; Trondal, 2004). Formalised 
policy networks are likely to move from being pure exchange relationships among 
independent actors to become formalised and institutionalised networks that socialise the 
network participants towards shared perceptions of administrative policy (Egeberg, Schaefer 
and Trondal, 2003; Richardson, 1996; Sahlin-Andersson, 2002, 45). IGOs like the OECD 
codify, compare and categorise reform concepts and integrate national officials in webs of 
expert committees where they become partly re-socialised into cosmopolitan advocates of 
international policy doctrines (Sahlin-Andersson, 2002). Domestic administrative institutions 
and civil servants that are embedded into such formalised transgovernmental networks tend to 
engage in international copying of best practices, imitating international standards of 
appropriate administrative policy (Egeberg and Trondal, 1997; Massey, 2004, 25).3 In EU 
phraseology formalised transgovernmental processes of imitation is labelled the Open Method 
of Coordination (OMC), focused on “a process of mutual learning based on peer pressure” 
(Kaiser and Prange, 2002, 4). Also OECD’s PUMA committee organises best practice 
exercises through the production and dissemination of reports (Marcussen, 2002). Processes 
of imitation of best practice tend to reduce local search for innovative solutions simply 
because there is an inbuilt tension between imitation and innovation (Olsen, 2004, 6). In sum, 
the network approach advocates that the internationalisation of domestic administrative policy 
is less forged by domestic government decisions and innovation than by loosely coupled 
processes of internationalisation where government institutions and civil servants imitate what 
is perceived as legitimate and efficient international standards of administrative policy.  
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Method and data 
The empirical observations offered in STEP II of the empirical analysis are based on a survey 
among A-level civil servants in the Norwegian MGA (officials involved in policy-shaping 
duties which require a university education). The survey, conducted in 2003, is based on a 
standardised questionnaire mailed to all A-level civil servants of the MGA (233). The 
response rate of the survey is 60 per cent, giving a sample of 140 respondents. This response 
rate equals the response-rate in similar survey studies in the Norwegian central administration 
(e.g. Christensen and Egeberg, 1997).  
 
The empirical analysis follows in two steps. Drawing on existing bodies of empirical 
research, Step I reports on the internationalisation of Norwegian administrative policy. Step II 
applies the above survey data to analyse the decision-making behaviour of the MGA officials. 
However, one methodological caveat is needed: Evidence of correlation between the decision-
making behaviour of MGA officias (STEP II) and the internationalisation of Norwegian 
administrative policy (STEP I) is merely an indication of causation, not proof thereof. These 
correlations can be causally related either ways. For example, a creeping internationalisation 
of administrative policy may foster a post hoc internationalisation of government decisions. 
However, our interpretation is the orthodox one (H1): Evidence of a perfect mach between 
decision-making processes and policy dynamics is interpreted according the organisation 
theory perspective. 
 
Research findings 
STEP I: The internationalisation of Norwegian administrative policy. 
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The Norwegian administrative policy has become increasingly complex by the import of 
NPM ideas that supplement existing administrative policy based on Weberian ideals of 
political loyalty and professional neutrality (Lægreid and Pedersen, 1999). NPM elements are 
added to the pre-existing policy repertoire, contributing to greater policy complexity. 
According to Lægreid and Pedersen (1994, 13), the increased number, correlates and hybrids 
of problems and solutions included in Norwegian administrative policy has made it less 
instrumental and less governable.  
 
Still, reforms of administrative policy have become a routine activity in Norway (Lægreid et 
al., 2004). Between 1947 and 1997 almost 400 white papers on administrative policy reform 
were produced and an increased share of those reports comes from the MGA (Rolland, 1999). 
Many of these documents have been heavily influenced by IGOs. The post WWII period has 
witnessed a proliferation of IGOs of which a few have demonstrated capabilities for changing 
domestic administrative policies, notably the OECD and the European Commission. The 
power of IGOs within the field of administrative policy has increasingly caused Norwegian 
MGA officials to direct their attention, energy and resources towards the IGOs. “[T]he OECD 
… act[s] as an ideational arbitrator that helps initiate a common learning process in the 
national public administrations. Consequently, the OECD today welcomes more than 40.000 
national civil servants in its committees on an annual basis, thereby allowing for direct policy 
deliberation with a view to developing a common scheme of reference across national 
boundaries” (Trondal, Marcussen and Veggeland, 2004, 23). 
 
Whereas NMP reforms often are pictured as initiated and spread by the OECD’s PUMA 
committee, the European Commission today occupies a stronger de facto role as 
administrative policy entrepreneur. The Commission has traditionally had few organisational 
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and economic resources and legal capacities for reforming domestic administrative policy 
(Olsen, 2003a). However, the Commission has directed increased attention to how domestic 
administrative bodies are organised in order to secure effective implementation of EU aquis 
communautaire. The Commission cannot direct or instruct adjustments in domestic 
administrative systems, but they increasingly use subtle and informal methods to secure 
administrative compliance (Statskonsult, 2003:3, 34). For example, the Commission 
increasingly pleas for a vertical specialisation of regulatory activities by establishing semi- 
autonomous agencies at the EU-level and within the member-states (Statskonsult, 2003:3). 
The aquis communautaire of the EU Internal Market increasingly accompany reforms of 
Norwegian administrative policy within affected policy areas, for example in the fields of 
pharmaceutical administration, alcohol control policy and in the administration of food safety 
(Moen, 1998; Ugland, 2002; Veggeland, 2004). In Denmark, the clearest shifts in Danish 
administrative policy came after the EU membership in 1973 (Grønnegård Christensen, 2002, 
63). Similarly, Egeberg and Trondal (1997) demonstrate that processes of transgovernmental 
imitation of administrative policy are constant over time whereas administrative reforms due 
to EU regulations increase over time (Egeberg and Trondal, 1997).  
 
Finnemore (1996) reveals that the widespread trend of establishing national research councils 
reflects the fact that countries adopt OECD and UNESCO standards of how to administer 
research activities. Similarly, Trondal (2002) demonstrates how Norwegian administrative 
policy within the field of research and higher education adapts to the EU research policy (H2). 
Hence, IGOs are more than neutral vessels and intergovernmental organisations. They are 
indeed transformative institutions with independent impact on domestic standards of 
appropriate administrative policy (Olsen, 2003a). IGOs are both transgovernmental epistemic 
communities and transgovernmental normative communities that socialise national civil 
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servants into shared notions of appropriate policy standards (Trondal, Marcussen and 
Veggeland, 2004). It is foremost domestic civil servants, not politicians, who participate in 
IGO expert meetings and hence who become carriers of administrative policy ideas (Lægreid 
and Pedersen, 1999, 14) (H2). IGOs are transformative institutions where administrative 
standards are imported, adjusted and exported as well as arenas where national civil servants 
learn about them. Hence, the import of administrative policy has been depoliticised and 
fragmented in domestic bureaucracies. Administrative policy reforms have been more 
adequately co-ordinated within national ministries like the MGA than across ministries 
(Trondal, 1999).  
 
Both in Norway and in the OECD the notion of embedded reform or contextualised NPM 
have gained ground (Christensen and Lægreid, 2002). Witnessing the influence of 
government decisions, the NPM concept has been adjusted to accommodate different and 
conflicting Norwegian policy concerns, like rule of law, political loyalty, professional 
autonomy, spheres of non-intervention, and integrated participation (H1). Sahlin-Andersson 
(2002) reveals that OECD’s PUMA committee provides broad policy prototypes for how to 
reform domestic administrative policy. Within these broad policy categories, however, there 
are ample room for national governance and the influence of existing domestic administrative 
structures (H1).  
 
Studies of the Europeanisation of public administration in the Nordic countries demonstrate 
that the politico-administrative leadership is fairly de-activated, particularly in Norway 
(Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen, 2004). Whereas the European Commission contribute to a 
fragmentation and segmentation of the Norwegian public administration, the Council of the 
European Union contributes to strengthen political accountability and national co-ordination 
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in the member-states (Egeberg, Schaefer and Trondal, 2003). Illustrative, the European Union 
aquis communautaire affect Norwegian policy sectors differently accompanying different 
administrative challenges to different agencies and directorates (Statskonsult, 2003:3).  
 
There is a neat fit between the sectoral organisation of the European Commission and the 
sectoral organisation of the Norwegian administrative apparatus. Norwegian administrative 
policy is organised into semi-autonomous sectors and often directed more by sector-
bureaucrats than by a coherent political leadership (Grønlie, 1999, 338). The Norwegian 
administrative apparatus for comprehensive and coherent administrative reforms is modest 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 1997, 371; Olsen, 1996, 188). The MGA has modest power in this 
regard compared to the combined capacities of the Ministry of Finance, the sector ministries 
and the semi-autonomous agencies beneath the ministry level.4 Hence, the sector-organisation 
of the public administration is reflected in a corresponding sectoralisation of administrative 
policy (H1). Christensen and Lægreid (1998) demonstrate that NPM reform elements are 
received differently in the various Norwegian ministries.  
 
For example, Norwegian hospitals have been reorganised and become vertically de-
specialised from the regional level to the state level of government. At the same time, semi-
autonomous regional authorities are established to monitor and control the new state-owned 
hospitals (Torjesen and Gammelsæter, 2004). One effect of this reform has been that local 
hospital managers increasingly develop local rationality directed at strategically, flexibly and 
creatively maximising local preferences (Torjesen and Gammelsæter, 2004). Trond Nordby 
(1993) documents that the administrative policy within the Norwegian health sector is 
strongly influenced by existing bureaucratic routines within the administrative apparatus (H1) 
as well as by international standards of health administration (H2). In the university sector, 
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Tom Christensen (1991) shows how the adoption of NPM reforms within the Norwegian 
university sector is both closely tied to government reform efforts (H1) and strongly filtered 
by institutional rules and practices at the university level. Finally, Einar Lie (1995) reveals 
that administrative policy within the Norwegian Ministry of Finance has become strongly 
filtered by existing traditions and institutionalised practices. Generally, NPM ideas seem to 
spread globally whereas NPM policies are implemented differently in different policy sectors 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2002). Even IGOs adapt flexibly to NPM elements. Geri (2001, 
253), reveals that none of the six UN agencies studied “is implementing a comprehensive set 
of NPM reforms”. NPM reforms are biased and filtered by the existing administrative 
structures and practices within the IGOs (H1) (Hood, 1991, 8). 
 
Administrative policy has accompanied changes in administrative practice, however, less in 
Norway than in other Anglo-Saxon countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). Reforms of 
administrative practice seem larger at local and regional levels of Norwegian government than 
within the central state apparatus, and more paramount within the administrative branch of de-
centralised agencies than within the political echelon of national ministries (Forsell, 2002, 
280). Examples include simplification of laws, budgeting reforms, improved service 
procedures, etc. NPM in Norway is pictured as incremental-transformative change where new 
vertically specialised administrative bodies and management-by-objectives procedures 
supplement existing hierarchical structures and rule-based administrative procedures 
(Christensen and Lægreid, 2002). The Norwegian administrative system remains intact, 
however, increasingly penetrated by efforts at comprehensive administrative innovation as 
well as external pressures from IGOs to imitate “global standards” of administrative policy.  
 
STEP II: Decision-making behaviour among MGA officials. 
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Egeberg and Trondal (1997) report that an increased share of Norwegian civil servants at the 
ministerial level works on international issues (24 per cent in 1976 and 33 per cent in 1996). 
The data on Norwegian MGA officials reveals that every fourth official work on international 
issues (24 per cent).5 Another indicator of internationalisation of decision-making behaviour 
is the extent to which civil servants copy international standards of best practice. Whereas 68 
per cent of the Norwegian civil servants did this in 1996, 62 per cent of current MGA officials 
report that they copy models or best practice from other countries (Egeberg and Trondal, 
1997, 347).6 Similarly, 46 per cent of the MGA officials report that they copy models and best 
practices from IGOs.7 These findings indicate that transgovernmental processes of imitation 
are important mechanisms of internationalisation within the Norwegian MGA. These 
observations also indicate that bilateral imitation (among states) is more important than 
multilateral imitation (through IGOs). “Norway seemed to reform some time after Britain” 
(Olsen, 1996, 16). Finally, 51 per cent of the MGA officials report that they are affected by 
the EU and/or the EEA agreement, mirroring the general tendency that Norwegian civil 
servants are increasingly participating in EU institutions and become penetrated by EU 
institutional dynamics (Egeberg and Trondal, 1997, 351; Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen, 
2004; Trondal, 1999).8 However, comparative studies also indicate that Norwegian civil 
servants are less internationally oriented and less active participants within EU institutions 
than Danish, Finish and Swedish government officials (Jacobsson, Lægreid and Pedersen, 
2004; Trondal and Veggeland, 2003). 
 
Table 1 reveals the national and international contact patterns among MGA officials. 
 
-- Table 1 about here -- 
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The contact pattern evoked by MGA officials is clearly associated with the vertical MGA 
hierarchy by the fact that their contacts are strongly directed towards their own politico-
administrative leadership (H1). The contact pattern is also strongly associated with the 
horizontal ministerial organisation by the fact that the amount of contact is stronger within 
than across ministerial borders. Notably, whereas 73 per cent of the officials have contacts 
with agencies beneath their own ministry, only 32 per cent report contacts with agencies 
underneath other ministries (H1). Moreover, the contact patterns are directed more strongly 
within their own ministry than towards IGOs. The most important contact-point 
internationally is ‘other international organisations’, notably the OECD (including the PUMA 
committee), ILO (the International Labour Organization), and the Nordic Council of 
Ministers (ordered by preference) (H2). Finally, MGA civil servants have considerably more 
contact towards ‘other international organisations’ (40 per cent) than towards the Norwegian 
Parliament (8 per cent). These findings at least indicate that transgovernmental imitation (H2) 
indeed supplement decision-making within the realm of the domestic government apparatus 
(H1). 
 
The officials were also asked to indicate if they have participated in EU committees “one time 
or more” during the last year (2003). Ranked by frequency, 17 per cent reported participating 
in other international committees, 13 per cent in Commission expert committees, and 8 per 
cent in EFTA and/or EEA committees. However, few MGA officials are active participants in 
these international committees. While 10 per cent report giving oral presentation in ‘other 
international organisations’ “fairly often or more”, 9 per cent report giving oral presentations 
in Commission expert committees “fairly often or more”. This level of activity is slightly 
below average compared to officials from other Norwegian ministries, let alone officials from 
other EU member-states (Beyers and Trondal, 2004).  
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Next, Table 2 reveals the concerns deemed important to MGA officials.  
 
-- Table 2 about here -- 
 
Civil servants have several organisational affiliations and cues for action, and also multiple 
role expectations (Jacobsen, 1960). Table 2 clearly shows that MGA civil servants take into 
account several considerations when making decisions within their own portfolio. Notably, 
Table 2 demonstrates that the decision-making behaviour of MGA civil servants reflect the 
vertical specialisation of the MGA by the fact that they emphasise signals from their ‘own’ 
politico-administrative leadership (H1). MGA officials are also Weberian bureaucrats who 
take into account procedures and laws, and they are professional experts who emphasise 
professional considerations. Furthermore, MGA officials are ‘modern’ civil servants who 
emphasise modernisation and reform. Less importance is assigned to the interest of other 
countries and IGOs. Those IGOs considered important are (ranked by preference) the EU, 
OECD, EFTA/EEA institutions, and ILO. In sum, the decision-making behaviour of MGA 
officials is governed by multiple concerns, notably by government hierarchy and the 
horizontally units and divisions, professional considerations and rule compliance (H1) Less 
emphasis is put on NPM concerns and the main carriers of NPM reform ideas – IGOs (H2).  
 
In addition, the officials were invited to assess claims concerning the degree of behavioural 
discretion available to them. According to H1 the decision-making behaviour evoked by 
government officials are guided by formal rules and codified norms. The data, however, 
indicates that whereas 66 per cent of the MGA civil servants report that they “always” decide 
on the basis of their professional expertise, 45 per cent act on behalf of hierarchical 
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instructions. Moreover, whereas 27 per cent of the officials claim that they “always” choose 
what decisions they should take, 15 per cent “always” have clear instructions about what 
decisions they should take. Hence, contrary to H1, the degree of behavioural discretion 
available to MGA officials is fairly great. At the same time, the majority of the officials are 
governed by clear rules and practices (64 per cent)9. Hence, despite MGA officials consider 
themselves as professional experts with behavioural discretion at their disposal (H2), they are 
also governed by ministerial rules, established practices and hierarchical command (H1).  
 
To underscore the above observations, Table 3 reveals the institutions deemed important by 
MGA officials.  
 
-- Table 3 about here -- 
 
Importantly, the MGA politico-administrative leadership is considered important. Notably, 
the administrative leadership is considered more important than the political leadership, 
reflecting the fact that MGA civil servants have considerable more contacts with the 
administrative leadership than with the political leadership (Table 1) (H1). Hence, those 
assessments reported in Table 3 reflect the vertical and horizontal organisation of MGA: 
Officials have more contact with their own politico-administrative leadership than with other 
ministries, and more contact with agencies beneath their own Ministry than with agencies 
below other ministries. Importantly, the Norwegian Parliament is considered important to 64 
per cent of the officials. Hence, despite few MGA officials have personal contacts with the 
Parliament (Table 1), this institution is deemed important. This observation suggests that the 
Parliament may affect ministerial decision-making through anticipated reaction. Finally, 
Table 3 demonstrates that IGOs are considered less important than domestic government 
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institutions. MGA officials consider the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) as the most 
important IGO. Other EFTA and EEA institutions and the European Commission are 
perceived as less important than the ESA. 
 
The officials were also invited to respond to the following assertions:  
 
-- Table 4 about here -- 
 
Consistent with the findings in Tables 1, 2 and 3, Table 4 demonstrates that the decision-
making behaviour of MGA officials is mostly associated with their domestic leadership, their 
professional expertise and ministerial rules and practices (H1). Table 4 reports that the 
majority of MGA officials do not consider IGOs as more important today than “earlier”. In 
fact, bilateral contacts with governments in other countries are deemed equally important as 
the European Commission and the ESA.  
 
The final question targeted is to what extent H1 and H2 explain NPM concerns among MGA 
officials (emphasising modernisation and reform). In the following OLS regression analysis 
H1 is tested by the two following variables: (i) Formal rank position of MGA officials, and 
(ii) the extent to which MGA officials have leadership tasks. H2 is measured by the following 
two variables: (iii) the extent to which MGA officials copy models from other countries and 
from (iv) IGOs. 
 
-- Table 5 about here -- 
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Table 6 reveals no significant coefficients and should thus be interpreted with caution. The 
strongest observation is that officials with leadership tasks tend to emphasise modernisation 
and reform more than officials with no leadership tasks. There is also a weak positive 
relationship between formal rank position and the tendency of emphasising modernisation and 
reform. These observations indeed support H1. Furthermore, emphasis on modernisation and 
reform is associated with copying models from IGOs rather than from other countries (H2). 
Hence, NPM policy elements seem to be partly emphasised by top rank officials with 
leadership tasks (H1), and by those officials who import models from IGOs (H2). 
 
Conclusions 
The empirical observations reported demonstrate that the field of administrative policy has 
become strongly internationlised whilst the decision-making processes of MGA is only 
moderately internationalised. Moreover, existing administrative policy is not replaced but 
supplemented by new NPM components. The analysis indicates a partial de-coupling of 
government decision-making (Step II) and the internationalisation of administrative policy 
(Step I). Administrative policy seems only partly steered and forged by the top ministerial 
leadership. The capacity for intentionally reforming administrative policy seems modest in the 
Norwegian case. The role of the Norwegian MGA has been more that of helper, motivator 
and stimulator than that of an instructor and director in the implementation of NPM reforms 
in the 1990s (Christensen and Lægreid, 1997, 378). The observations presented above support 
this conclusion. The transgovernmental diffusion of administrative policy ideas have 
accompanied a loose coupling of government decisions and administrative policy. The 
internationalisation of Norwegian administrative policy thus resembles the ‘traditional pattern 
of administrative internationalisation’ which is loosely coupled to government oversight. The 
mere fact that the MGA officials reported that EU, OECD, EFTA/EEA institutions and the 
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ILO are important IGOs when copying international models and standards reflect 
transgovernmental processes of imitation (H2).  
 
However, the analysis also supports the orthodox organisation theory perspective (H1). The 
internationalisation of Norwegian administrative policy seems to be fostered by a mix of 
learning dynamics within transgovernmental networks (H2), and government decision-
making and policy innovations (H1). However, the internationalisation of administrative 
policy seems less coupled to government control than assumed by organisation theory 
orthodoxy (H1). The internationalisation of administrative policy reflects “learning and 
voluntary imitation” within transgovernmental networks, not only hierarchical imposition 
(Olsen 2003a: 512).  
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TABLES 
Table 1: “Can you estimate how often you had contacts with the following during the 
last year”?* (per cent) 
The political leadership (Minister, State Secretary and/or 
Political Advicors) 
 
46 
The administrative leadership (Director General, Secretary 
General) 
 
88 
Other sections or department in MGA 90 
Other ministries 79 
Agencies beneath the MGA 73 
Agencies beneath other ministries 32 
The Norwegian Parliament 8 
The European Commission 4 
The Council of Ministers 2 
EFTA’s Surveillance Authority (ESA) 2 
Other EEA/EFTA institutions 7 
Other IGOs 40 
Mean N 132 
* Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: very often (1), fairly often (2), both and (3), fairly 
seldom (4), very seldom (5). 
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Table 2: “What importance do you assign to the following concerns when doing your 
work?”* (per cent)  
Modernisation and reform 65 
Signals from the political leadership (Minister, State Secretary, 
Political Advisors) 
85 
Signals from the administrative leadership (Director General, 
Secretary General) 
87 
Professional considerations 92 
Proper procedures, current law 86 
The interests of IGOs 24 
Mean N 126 
* Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: very important (1), fairly important (2), both and 
(3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5). 
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Table 3: “How important are the following institutions when central decisions are made 
within your portfolio?”* (per cent) 
Own political leadership (Minister, State Secretary, Political 
Advisors) 
 
79 
Own administrative leadership (Director General, Secretary 
General) 
 
91 
Other ministries 50 
Agencies beneath the MGA 53 
Agencies beneath other ministries 20 
The Norwegian Parliament 64 
The European Commission 19 
The Council of Ministers 13 
EFTA’s Surveillance Authority (ESA) 27 
Other EEA/EFTA institutions 19 
Other IGOs 15 
Mean N 117 
* Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: very important (1), fairly important (2), both and 
(3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5). 
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Table 4: “Please consider the following assertions”*: (per cent) 
“The European Commission has become more important than earlier 
within my portfolio” 
 
35 
“Other EU institutions have become more important than earlier within 
my portfolio” 
 
27 
“EFTA’s Surveillance Authority (ESA) has become more important 
than earlier within my portfolio” 
 
32 
“Other international organisations have become more important than 
earlier within my portfolio” 
 
14 
“Bilateral contacts with governments in other countries have become 
more important than earlier” 
 
33 
Mean N 125 
* Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: very correct (1), fairly correct (2), both and (3), 
fairly wrong (4), very wrong (5). 
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Table 5: Factors relating to the extent to which MGA officials emphasise modernisation 
and reform (beta) a, b 
(i) Formal rank position .15 
(ii) Leadership tasks .24 
(iii) Copying models from other countries -.21 
(iv) Copying models from IGOs .18 
*) p ≤ .05          **) p ≤ .01 
R2 =                                                                     .07 
a) Diagnostics of collinearity between the independent variables in this table unveil no indications of extreme 
multicollinearity 
b) The dependent variable has the following values: Very important (value 1), fairly important (2), both/and 
(3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5). The independent variables have the following values: 
Formal rank position: Executive officer (1), higher executive officer (2), principal officer (3), assistant 
director general (4), deputy director general (5), director general (6), and positions over director general 
(7). Leadership tasks: Yes (1), No (2).  Copying models from other countries and from international 
organisations: Very often (1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CES – Working paper no. 4, 2004 
 
33
NOTES 
                                                 
1 The financial support of Sørlandets kompetansefond is gratefully acknowledged. The author would like to 
thank Secretary General Tore Eriksen, Deputy Director General Jon Oftedal and Director Oddbjørn Lyngroth for 
valuable comments on the project. 
2 Several variables may be coupled and de-coupled in public administration: the organisation and its 
environment, the horizontal and vertical formal structures of the organisation, the past and present, as well as 
talk, decisions and action (Brunsson, 1989; Weick, 1976; March and Olsen, 1979). Ideas about public 
administration often spread faster than the practice of public administration, contributing to a situational and 
sequential de-coupling of administrative policy and practice (Brunsson, 1989; Christensen and Lægreid, 2002). 
3 Such processes may be more or less conscious: It may be based on a utility-maximising calculus or borrowing 
best practice from others, or on a cognitive process of imitating environmental demands.  
4 Whereas the Ministry of Finance is a powerful actor in domestic administrative policy in countries like 
Denmark, Sweden and Ireland, the Norwegian Ministry of Finance has an ambiguous role in Norwegian 
administrative policy (Statskonsult, 1996:12, 22). 
5 This involves officials devoting some, fairly much and very much of their working time on international issues. 
6 This involves officials collecting ideals very often, fairly often or sometimes.  
7 This involves officials collecting ideals very often, fairly often or sometimes. 
8 This involves officials who are affected to a very great extent, to a fairly great extent and somewhat.  
9 Value 1, 2 and 3 combined on the following five-point scale: very clear rules and practices (1), fairly clear rules 
and practices (2), both/and (3), I have to use fairly much discretion (4), I have to use very much discretion (5). 
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